Reinforcement learning in population games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006zbMath1281.91035OpenAlexW1974738471MaRDI QIDQ2435889

Robert M. Seymour, Ratul Lahkar

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscontinuity equationreinforcement learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

The dynamics of generalized reinforcement learning ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution ⋮ Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium

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