Matching through position auctions
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Publication:2447275
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009zbMath1285.91102OpenAlexW2032699496MaRDI QIDQ2447275
Publication date: 25 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.009
Related Items
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching, Informational hold up and intermediaries, Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions, Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality, Matching with peer monitoring, Position auctions with multi-unit demands, Synchronized matching with incomplete information, Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
Cites Work
- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
- Monopolistic Signal Provision
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Asymptotic Statistics
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Coarse Matching