The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
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Publication:2462287
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.004zbMath1271.91019OpenAlexW3013762119MaRDI QIDQ2462287
Publication date: 30 November 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume28/EB-02AA0011A.pdf
Related Items
On the characterizations of viable proposals, NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem, Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core, On the accessibility of the core, Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes, The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
Cites Work
- The coalition structure core is accessible
- A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- A property of the core
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores
- Viable Proposals
