Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0230-7zbMath1133.91458OpenAlexW2109762653MaRDI QIDQ2475990

René van den Brink

Publication date: 11 March 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0230-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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