Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
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Publication:2507850
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004zbMath1138.91304MaRDI QIDQ2507850
Publication date: 5 October 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004
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