Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0209-5zbMath1079.91003OpenAlexW2084304329MaRDI QIDQ2572446

Akihiro Suzuki, Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 9 November 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0209-5

zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-person gameprisoner's dilemmaconsistent setfarsighted stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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