Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0186-3zbMath1121.91311OpenAlexW2131575306MaRDI QIDQ2642885

Martin Sefton, Jan Potters, Lise Vesterlund

Publication date: 6 September 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3

zbMATH Keywords

ReciprocityPublic goodsSignalingLeading-by-exampleVoluntary provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (15)

The limit of targeting in networks ⋮ An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory ⋮ Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game ⋮ Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding ⋮ Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework ⋮ Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence ⋮ Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis ⋮ Leadership and the effective choice of information regime ⋮ Relative social status and conformism: experimental evidence on local public good contributions ⋮ Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness ⋮ What happens if you single out? An experiment ⋮ Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent ⋮ Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations ⋮ Should I stay or should I go? Congestion pricing and equilibrium selection in a transportation network ⋮ Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cites Work

• A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility
• What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence.
• Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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