Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_4zbMath1331.91066OpenAlexW177300510MaRDI QIDQ2787396

Olivier Bochet, Ton Storcken

Publication date: 25 February 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision Library C (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule ⋮ Nash implementable domains for the Borda count ⋮ Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules ⋮ A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions

Cites Work

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• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Dictatorial domains
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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