Monopolistic Signal Provision

DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0003zbMath1277.91024OpenAlexW2071358233MaRDI QIDQ2867511

Luis Rayo

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0003

zbMATH Keywords

signalingnonlinear pricinginformation disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Price discrimination and efficient matching ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Conveying value via categories ⋮ Dress to impress: brands as status symbols ⋮ Matching through position auctions ⋮ Coarse matching with incomplete information ⋮ Perception games and privacy ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection ⋮ Persuasion with costly precision

Cites Work

• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Monopoly and product quality
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Indirect public control of self-managed monopolies
• OPTIMAL GRADING
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Optimal Auction Design
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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