Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 22:48, 3 February 2024 by Import240129110113 (talk | contribs) (Created automatically from import240129110113)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

Publication:3088085


DOI10.1007/978-3-642-22935-0_8zbMath1343.91023MaRDI QIDQ3088085

Anand Bhalgat, Sanjeev Khanna, Deeparnab Chakrabarty

Publication date: 17 August 2011

Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/663


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91B68: Matching models

91B15: Welfare economics


Related Items

Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching, Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management, Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship, A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching, Ordinal approximation for social choice, matching, and facility location problems given candidate positions, Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem, Size versus fairness in the assignment problem, Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem, Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive, Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design, Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money



Cites Work

Retrieved from "https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/w/index.php?title=Publication:3088085&oldid=16152368"
Powered by MediaWiki