Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
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Publication:3182917
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03816-7_11zbMath1250.68074MaRDI QIDQ3182917
Giuseppe Persiano, Paolo Penna, Vincenzo Auletta
Publication date: 16 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03816-7_11
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