Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3401190
DOI10.1162/QJEC.2006.121.2.505zbMath1179.91124OpenAlexW3122035289MaRDI QIDQ3401190
Publication date: 29 January 2010
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4554333
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items (42)
A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors ⋮ Competitive search obfuscation ⋮ The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms ⋮ A not so myopic axiomatization of discounting ⋮ Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment ⋮ Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation ⋮ Why firms' exploitation of consumer myopia May benefit myopic consumers ⋮ Partial shrouding in asymmetric markets ⋮ Price reveal auctions ⋮ Incorporating unawareness into contract theory ⋮ Market failure in a new model of platform design with partially informed consumers ⋮ Inattentive consumers in markets for services ⋮ EXCESSIVE COMPETITION ON HEADLINE PRICES ⋮ Buridanic competition ⋮ Misperception and cognition in markets ⋮ Impact of consumer foresight on efficient overselling ⋮ Fishing for fools ⋮ A multiattribute decision time theory ⋮ Framing contingencies in contracts ⋮ Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies ⋮ Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter? ⋮ Reconciling normative and behavioural economics: the problems to be solved ⋮ The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity ⋮ Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard ⋮ When consumers do not make an active decision: dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects ⋮ Multi-task agency with unawareness ⋮ Does add-on presence always lead to lower baseline prices? Theory and evidence ⋮ Trader matching and the selection of market institutions ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers ⋮ Aspiration-based choice ⋮ Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining ⋮ Guessing with negative feedback: an experiment ⋮ Signal extraction: experimental evidence ⋮ Contextual deliberation and the choice-valuation preference reversal ⋮ Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study ⋮ An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Overcoming choice inertia through social interaction -- an agent-based study of mobile subscription decision ⋮ Sellouts, beliefs, and bandwagon behavior ⋮ Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
This page was built for publication: Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
