Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order

DOI10.3982/ECTA7583zbMath1182.62013OpenAlexW2126640070MaRDI QIDQ3402307

John K.-H. Quah, Bruno Strulovici

Publication date: 3 February 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7583

zbMATH Keywords

supermodularitycomparative staticsoptimal stopping timestatistical decision theoryinformativenesssingle crossing propertycomplete class theoremcapital deepeninginterval dominance order

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics in engineering and industry; control charts (62P30) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Statistical decision theory (62C99) Optimal stopping in statistics (62L15)

Related Items

Comparing optimal choices with multi-dimensional action spaces, On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies, Lattice-based monotone comparative statics on saving with Selden/Kreps-Porteus preferences, Games with strategic complements and substitutes, Sequential search and firm prominence, Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty, Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses, Groundwater usage and strategic complements. II. (Revealed Preferences), Interval dominance based structural results for Markov decision process, Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling, A dual approach to agency problems, Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes, On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models, Comparing information in general monotone decision problems, Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements, Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set, Characterizing monotone games, Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property, Does more information-gathering effort raise or lower the average quantity produced?, Optimal switching between cash-flow streams, Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games, A note on pre-play communication, Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities, The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences, Generalized monotonicity analysis, Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard, Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes, Directional monotone comparative statics, Price competition with differentiated goods and incomplete product awareness, Comparative statics and heterogeneity, Stochastic Comparative Statics in Markov Decision Processes, Index-wise comparative statics, Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences