THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
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Publication:3444834
DOI10.1142/S0219198906001211zbMath1274.91074MaRDI QIDQ3444834
Richard H. Stockbridge, Ziyu Zheng
Publication date: 5 June 2007
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; differential game; noncooperative game; dynamic game; stopping game; randomized strategy; mixed strategy; pedestrian principle; rational prediction
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
60H30: Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.)
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