Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders

DOI10.1145/1060590.1060681zbMath1192.68890OpenAlexW2126085282MaRDI QIDQ3581408

Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira, Noam Nisan

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060681

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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