Swap Bribery

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Publication:3648865

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_27zbMath1262.91056arXiv0905.3885OpenAlexW2913352891WikidataQ61586277 ScholiaQ61586277MaRDI QIDQ3648865

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 1 December 2009

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3885




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