Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments

DOI10.1080/00222500902747360zbMath1275.91021MaRDI QIDQ3650939

Pier Luigi Sacco, Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500902747360

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamics; cooperation; evolution of preferences; coordination; socially sensitive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency, A positional game for an overlapping generation economy

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