The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions

DOI10.1287/mnsc.35.6.685zbMath0676.90007OpenAlexW2043602112MaRDI QIDQ3832292

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/28707

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsoptimal biddingrisk-neutral agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders ⋮ Regret in auctions: theory and evidence ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Fishing for fools ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Robust monopoly pricing ⋮ Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory ⋮ Contests with rank-order spillovers ⋮ Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions ⋮ The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ Auction fever: rising revenue in second-price auction formats ⋮ Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions ⋮ Multicriteria support for construction bidding

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