Three characterizations of population strategy stability
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Publication:3882247
DOI10.2307/3213023zbMath0439.92021OpenAlexW4250130709MaRDI QIDQ3882247
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3213023
attractorsNash equilibriumevolutionarily stable strategyESSconflict modelsco-operative strategiespopulation strategy stability
Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)
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