Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00318zbMath1103.91025OpenAlexW3123438719MaRDI QIDQ4663343

Peter Norman

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00318

zbMATH Keywords

public goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

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