Approximate Cores of Large Games

DOI10.2307/1913508zbMath0616.90105MaRDI QIDQ4726084

William R. Zame, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913508

zbMATH Keywords

core of a game; large games; non-empty approximate cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B50: General equilibrium theory

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