Approximate Cores of Large Games

DOI10.2307/1913508zbMath0616.90105OpenAlexW2011643472MaRDI QIDQ4726084

William R. Zame, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913508

zbMATH Keywords

core of a gamelarge gamesnon-empty approximate cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (18)

Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem ⋮ Large games: Fair and stable outcomes ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ A model of multiproduct price competition ⋮ Some infinite-player generalizations of Scarf's theorem: finite-coalition \(\alpha\)-cores and weak \(\alpha\)-cores ⋮ On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects. ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players ⋮ Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games ⋮ The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents ⋮ The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics ⋮ The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)

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