Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014zbMath1186.91110OpenAlexW2042281118MaRDI QIDQ996376

Hamid Sabourian, Jihong Lee

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

complexityefficiencybargainingbounded rationalitytransaction costrepeated gameCoase theoremautomaton

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Complexity and repeated implementation ⋮ Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games ⋮ Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity

Cites Work

• Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Finite automata equilibria with discounting
• Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
• Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Complexity and Competition

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