Informational hold up and intermediaries
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6105131
DOI10.3390/g13050063zbMath1519.91135MaRDI QIDQ6105131
Publication date: 26 June 2023
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Matching through position auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- The assignment game. I: The core
- E-sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Noncompetitive Contracts
- Intermediated Trade *
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
This page was built for publication: Informational hold up and intermediaries