A note on optimal allocation mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.12.013MaRDI QIDQ1036859zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 13 November 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26022

zbMATH Keywords

bunchingmechanism designoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory
• Haggling over substitutes
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(20)

• A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
• Slot allocation: a model of competition between firms when consumers are procedurally rational
• Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
• Purification of incentive compatible allocations
• On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs
• Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
• On the optimality of not allocating
• A NOTE ON LUENBERGER'S ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS
• On voluntary and efficient allocations
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• Efficient allocations under ambiguity
• On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design: comment
• Optimization and mechanism design
• On the efficiency and optimality of random allocations

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