Approval-based shortlisting

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01482-2MaRDI QIDQ7014368zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Martin Lackner, Jan Malý

Publication date 11 March 2025

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-023-01482-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites work

• (F)Lexicographic shortlist method
• A simple model of two-stage choice
• Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach
• An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
• Approval elections with a variable number of winners
• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Bargaining through approval
• Behavioral implications of shortlisting procedures
• Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules
• Electoral systems. Paradoxes, assumptions, and procedures
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• Introduction to the theory of voting
• Judgment aggregation
• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
• Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
• Multiagent Systems
• Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners
• Properties of multiwinner voting rules
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
• Understanding machine learning. From theory to algorithms

Cited in

(1)

• Proportional justified representation

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