Axiomatic characterizations of voting operators

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00060-3MaRDI QIDQ5932335zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Somdeb Lahiri

Publication date 3 July 2001

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00060-3

zbMATH Keywords

Oligarchic rulesplurality rulespecial choicevoting operators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
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• Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
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• Impossibility results for choice correspondences
• Majority functional operators in voting theory
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions

Cited in

(10)

• Voting operators in the space of choice functions
• A non-dictatorial compromise
• Dictatorial voting operators
• Local voting models. A review of the axiomatic methods
• Simple collective identity functions
• An axiomatization of success
• Implementation of voting operators
• An axiomatic characterization of linear orders
• Abstract aggregation functions and social choice
• On the role of language in social choice theory

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