Bargaining over bets
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Cites work
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
- Optimal Dissent in Organizations
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments
Cited in
(13)- Risk, uncertainty and hidden information
- Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
- Geanakoplos and Sebenius model with noise.
- An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5997445 (Why is no real title available?)
- Last round betting
- ON PRE-PLAY NEGOTIATIONS AND ZERO-SUM BETTING
- Simple bets to elicit private signals
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Optimal speculative trade among large traders
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