Bayesian combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1145/2835172MaRDI QIDQ5895072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Michael Schapira

Publication date 2 August 2018

Published in Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2835172

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsgame theorymechanism designsimultaneous item-bidding auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(40)

• Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction
• Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
• Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction
• Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
• Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
• Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auctions
• Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
• Prophet inequalities made easy: stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs
• Bayesian auctions with friends and foes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4007437 (Why is no real title available?)
• Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax and round
• Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• Item bidding for combinatorial public projects
• On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Bayesian combinatorial auctions: expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Equilibria of greedy combinatorial auctions
• An O(\log \log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Tight welfare guarantees for pure Nash equilibria of the uniform price auction
• Stability of decentralized queueing networks beyond complete bipartite cases
• Quantum advantage beyond entanglement in Bayesian game theory
• Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding
• Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions
• Multi-agent contracts
• Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue
• Competitive mechanisms for energy-efficient cloud computing
• Fair and truthful allocations under leveled valuations
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Multi-agent contracts

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