Cheap talk and lie detection

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.007MaRDI QIDQ7297109zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yin Chi Tam

Publication date 15 July 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Communication with forgetful liars
• Costly miscalibration
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Value of public information in sender-receiver games

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