Coordination with sequential information acquisition
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Cites work
- Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning
- Characterizing social value of information
- Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
- Coordination and delay in global games
- Coordination cycles
- Coordination with flexible information acquisition
- Dynamic coordination with individual learning
- Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
- Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
- Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
- Funding Criteria for Research, Development, and Exploration Projects
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3638998 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1396804 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215685 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information Acquisition and Welfare
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
- Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
- Information quality and crises in regime-change games
- Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
- Optimal learning before choice
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
- The Optimal Level of Experimentation
- Tractable dynamic global games and applications
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