Dynamic moral hazard without commitment

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0494-6MaRDI QIDQ267083zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Larry Samuelson, Johannes Hörner

Publication date 8 April 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1989.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcash flow diversioncommitmentdynamic moral hazardprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
• The curse of long horizons
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting

Cites work

• A first course in Sobolev spaces
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
• Conditions for optimality in dynamic programming and for the limit of n-stage optimal policies to be optimal
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3632405 (Why is no real title available?)
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Smoothness of the Policy Function in Discrete Time Economic Models
• The probabilistic method. With an appendix on the life and work of Paul Erdős.
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(5)

• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods
• A principal-agent relationship with no advantage to commitment

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