Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.010MaRDI QIDQ1735737zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Francesc Dilmé

Publication date 29 March 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-019.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic moral hazardendogenous effortdynamic signaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
• Noisy signaling in discrete time
• Pricing and signaling with frictions
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

Cites work

• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Introduction to Partial Differential Equations
• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
• Optimal entry timing
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Reputation in continuous-time games
• Search with adverse selection
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• The Optimal Level of Experimentation
• Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(7)

• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Strategic real options
• Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
• Unobservable costly effort in security design
• Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
• Seller experimentation and trade
• Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

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