Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111775MaRDI QIDQ6594328zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Takaaki Abe

Publication date 28 August 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111775

zbMATH Keywords

axiomcoalition structurecooperative gameequal surplus sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
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• New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions
• Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
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Cites work

• A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164592 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• On the stability of coalition structures
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Stability and values for games with coalition structures
• THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE
• The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
• The in-group egalitarian Owen values
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games

Cited in

(1)

• From neighbors to components: the equivalence of fairness for neighbors and gap preservation

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