Evolutionary learning in signalling games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0795MaRDI QIDQ5928235zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Jørgen Jacobson, Mogens H. Jensen, Birgitte Sloth

Publication date 6 July 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/94890e5d0439c0d4377a784b19500f4f4bc62aba, http://curis.ku.dk/ws/files/32246138/9901.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionlearningsignalling gamesstochastic trembles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Review text

The authors study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process they study extends that introduced by \textit{H. P. Young} [Econometrica 61, 57-84 (1993; Zbl 0773.90101)] to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria; if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the Riley equilibrium frequently.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(19)

• Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model
• The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
• Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
• An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
• The evolution of ambiguity in sender -- receiver signaling games
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• Equilibrium vengeance
• Signaling games. Dynamics of evolution and learning
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189215 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning with neighbours
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748673 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning and type compatibility in signaling games
• Evolutionary game theory
• The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information
• Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games
• Evolution and information in a gift-giving game
• Stochastic evolution with slow learning
• Dynamics of signaling games
• Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection

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