Hardness results for stable exchange problems
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Cites work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5049926 (Why is no real title available?)
- Kidney Exchange
- Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the parameterized complexity of multiple-interval graph problems
- Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
- The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
- The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
- Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(8)- The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
- Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem
- Tropical vertex-disjoint cycles of a vertex-colored digraph: barter exchange with multiple items per agent
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
- Local stability in kidney exchange programs
- Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: a literature survey and empirical evaluation
- Computational complexity of the problem of choosing exchange alternatives with a limited number of indivisible resources
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