How proper is sequential equilibrium?

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0518MaRDI QIDQ1357403zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date 10 June 1997

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1161.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

lexicographic probability systemsproper equilibriumstrategic independence respecting equilibriumstrategy profile of a normal form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• How proper is sequential equilibrium?
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Normal form structures in extensive form games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

Cited in

(8)

• How proper is sequential equilibrium?
• Extended proper equilibrium
• Lexicographic probabilities and robustness
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
• A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium
• Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation
• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium

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