Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
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Cited in
(74)- The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
- Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
- Foundations of probability
- Directed lexicographic rationalizability
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Belief and probability: a general theory of probability cores
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
- Common assumption of rationality
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
- Admissibility and assumption
- Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
- Lexicographic probabilities and robustness
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Perfect equilibrium points and lexicographic domination
- Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- When no price is right
- A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection
- Updating confidence in beliefs
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
- A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
- Weak assumption and iterative admissibility
- Extended proper equilibrium
- Independence for full conditional probabilities: structure, factorization, non-uniqueness, and Bayesian networks
- Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
- Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
- Fall back proper equilibrium
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products
- Coalitional strategic games
- Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: inside the black box
- Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450031 (Why is no real title available?)
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Lexicographic expected utility without completeness
- Comparative expectations
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games
- An algorithm for proper rationalizability
- A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- Self-recognition in teams
- PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
- Conditional models: coherence and inference through sequences of joint mass functions
- A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium
- An overview of lexicographic choice under uncertainty
- Weak belief and permissibility
- Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
- An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- Notes on ``Notes on conditional previsions
- Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
- On the evaluation of solution concepts
- Non-additive beliefs and strategic equilibria
- Tempered best response dynamics
- Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
- A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
- A finite characterization of perfect equilibria
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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