Meritocracy versus diversity
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Cites work
- Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1757951 (Why is no real title available?)
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Matching with floor constraints
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- Optimal assignments in an ordered set: An application of matroid theory
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
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