Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110148MaRDI QIDQ824032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hong Gao, Haibo Xu

Publication date 14 December 2021

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110148

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriadelay in equilibriumendogenous proceduremultilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites work

• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• Decentralized one-to-many bargaining
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Cited in

(11)

• Multilateral Bargaining
• Endogenous reference points in bargaining
• A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
• Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1190649 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747908 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

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