One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2008.06.009MaRDI QIDQ1797596zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Immanuel M. Bomze, Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date 22 October 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2627408

zbMATH Keywords

common interest gamesfixation probabilitiesfrequency-dependent Moran processlanguage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
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Cites work

• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• Finite populations choose an optimal language
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• The logic of animal conflict
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system

Cited in

(11)

• Strategy abundance in 2 2 games for arbitrary mutation rates
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
• Strategy selection in structured populations
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
• From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive
• Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law

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