On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_60zbMATH Open1346.91096arXiv1309.6474OpenAlexW1936473545MaRDI QIDQ315522FDOQ315522

Authors: J. Díaz, Ioannis Giotis, Evangelos Markakis, L. M. Kirousis, Maria Serna 

Publication date: 21 September 2016

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.6474

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zbMATH Keywords

auctionskeyword auctionssecond pricesponsored search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
• Polyhedral clinching auctions and the AdWords polytope
• Repeated budgeted second price ad auction
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
• Sponsored search auctions
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

Cited In (3)

• Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
• On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets
• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints

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