Selling two goods optimally
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DOI10.1016/j.ic.2018.02.016zbMath1396.91247arXiv1510.03399OpenAlexW2791906826MaRDI QIDQ1641015
Elias Koutsoupias, Yiannis Giannakopoulos
Publication date: 14 June 2018
Published in: Information and Computation, Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03399
Related Items (10)
Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders ⋮ Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
Cites Work
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