On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
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Recommendations
- Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
- Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value
- Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
- Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
- Executive compensation and risk taking
- Impact of compensation structure and managerial incentives on bank risk taking
- On relative performance, remuneration and risk taking of asset managers
- An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
Cites work
- Explicit solutions of some utility maximization problems in incomplete markets
- Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
- MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN THE PRESENCE OF DYNAMIC FLOWS
- Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice
- Risk Management with Benchmarking
- The asymptotic elasticity of utility functions and optimal investment in incomplete markets
- The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation, incentives and optimality of executive stock options
- VALUATION OF CLAIMS ON NONTRADED ASSETS USING UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
Cited in
(14)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260087 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
- How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
- Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value
- Executive compensation and risk taking
- Managerial performance incentives and firm risk during economic expansions and recessions
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
- Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
- Options can induce risk taking for arbitrary preferences
- Own-company stockholding and work effort preferences of an unconstrained executive
- Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management
- Acquisition of information to diversify contractual risk
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
- Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
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