Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation

DOI10.3982/TE5655MaRDI QIDQ6664087zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Philippe Jehiel, Konrad Mierendorff

Publication date 16 January 2025

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsbelief formationanalogy-based expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
• Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Robust Mechanism Design
• The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price

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