Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
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Publication:6664087
DOI10.3982/TE5655MaRDI QIDQ6664087FDOQ6664087
Authors: Philippe Jehiel, Konrad Mierendorff
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
- Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations
- Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
- The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
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