Reputation with noisy precommitment

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2344MaRDI QIDQ1381963zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David K. Levine, César Martinelli

Publication date 1 April 1998

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.dklevine.com/papers/cesar11.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

private informationStackelberg leaderlong-run player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

• Reputation with observed actions
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
• Reputation and exogenous private learning

Cites work

• Commitment and observability in games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and imperfect information

Cited in

(5)

• Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning
• Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

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