On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences

DOI10.1007/s00224-021-10055-8zbMath1493.91093arXiv1905.02844OpenAlexW3214230071MaRDI QIDQ5918706

C. Gregory Plaxton, Chi-Kit Lam

Publication date: 21 June 2022

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.02844

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenessstable matchingthree-dimensional matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

Popular matchings in complete graphs ⋮ Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Counterexamples of small size for three-sided stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Minimal instances with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with cyclic incomplete preferences ⋮ Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences ⋮ A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences

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