Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
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Publication:1181755
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(91)90024-LzbMath0743.90120MaRDI QIDQ1181755
Mamoru Kaneko, Takashi Nagashima
Publication date: 27 June 1992
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic ⋮ The logical representation of extensive games ⋮ Epistemic considerations of decision making in games ⋮ Game logic and its applications. I ⋮ On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
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