A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much?

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.05.008zbMath1337.91063OpenAlexW2161980178WikidataQ50626600 ScholiaQ50626600MaRDI QIDQ289425

Ingela Alger, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 30 May 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitycooperationaltruismHamilton's rulespite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (21)

Evolutionary games and matching rules ⋮ Evolving cooperation ⋮ On the spatial diffusion of cooperation with endogenous matching institutions ⋮ Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term ⋮ Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas ⋮ Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals ⋮ An evolutionary theory of monogamy ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Political institutions and the evolution of character traits ⋮ Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity ⋮ Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior ⋮ Call to action: intrinsic motives and material interests ⋮ Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations ⋮ Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability ⋮ Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture ⋮ Evolution and Kantian morality ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user ⋮ Hamilton's rule, the evolution of behavior rules and the wizardry of control theory

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