Fair implementation of diversity in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.003zbMath1347.91201OpenAlexW2320344639MaRDI QIDQ290161

Inácio Bó

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/152588/1/1_s2.0_S089982561630001X_main_1_.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanism designdiversityschool choiceaffirmative action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (5)

When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ Matching through institutions ⋮ School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach

Cites Work

• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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