The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited

DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2016.07.012zbMath1390.91129WikidataQ60255880 ScholiaQ60255880MaRDI QIDQ324692

Raúl Pérez-Fernández, Michael Rademaker, Bernard De Baets

Publication date: 17 October 2016

Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2016.07.012

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicity; social choice; monometric; ranking rule; scorix

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Representations of votes based on pairwise information: monotonicity versus consistency, Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties, Monotonicity as a tool for differentiating between truth and optimality in the aggregation of rankings

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